Tribal Sovereignty: Another Look, Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974) by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1975 Issue 3 
January 1975 
Tribal Sovereignty: Another Look, Crowe v. Eastern Band of 
Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tribal Sovereignty: Another Look, Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 
1974), 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 815 (1975). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss3/8 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: ANOTHER LooK
Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc.,
506 F.2d 1231 (4th Cir. 1974)
A "Land Division Agreement," executed in 1960 by the heirs of
William T. Saunooke, assigned plaintiff a possessory interest' in an
eleven acre tract.' In 1970, upon request of another heir, the Tribal
Council of the Eastern Band of Cherokees instructed its Lands Commit-
tee to redivide the Saunooke land holdings among the heirs. Without
notice or hearing, the Lands Committee rescinded plaintiff's possessory
interest in the eleven acre tract.3 Plaintiff charged that the tribal action
1. Plaintiff was one of eight surviving children of William T. Saunooke. At the
time of his death, Saunooke occupied a 59.60 acre tract of land on the Cherokee Reser-
vation in North Carolina. He held a possessory interest in the tract by consent of the
Tribal Council. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1232
(4th Cir. 1974).
Characteristically, the right to possession of reservation property is vested in the tribe,
not its individual members. Tribes either formally assign incidents of ownership,
notably rights of occupancy, or simply recognize an individual's right to occupancy
through custom or usage. Tribal laws and customs determine the character and extent
of the rights enjoyed by occupants of tribal land. The status of an Indian occupant is
comparable to that of a common law licensee or tenant at will, but his right to posses-
sion is generally made more secure by tribal law and custom. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK
oF FEDmtAL INDIAN LAw 188, 288 (1942) [hereinafter cited as CoHEN].
Legal title to all lands constituting the Cherokee Reservation is held by the United
States as trustees for the Eastern Band of Cherokees by deed dated July 21, 1925. Crowe
v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1232 (4th Cir. 1974). For
a history of the Eastern Band of Cherokees, see United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300
(4th Cir. 1931). See also United States v. Colvard, 89 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1937);
United States v. Parton, 46 F. Supp. 843 (W.D.N.C. 1942), rev'd, 132 F.2d 886 (4th
Cir. 1943); R. SnucKLAND, FcE AND Tn SPmrrs (1975); note 25 infra and accompany-
ing text.
2. The "Land Division Agreement" was a prelude to the execution of a lease
agreement which conveyed the entire 59.60 acres to a nonmember of the tribe. The
conveyance, which explicitly referred to plaintiff's eleven acre interest, received the re-
quired approval of both the Tribal Council and the Secretary of the Interior. Addition-
ally, a May 14, 1962, settlement and consent order entered by the district court in an
action by the lessee against the Saunooke heirs and the Cherokee Tribe had referred
to plaintiff's possessory rights. That settlement was also approved by the Tribal Coun-
cil. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1233 (4th Cir.
1974).
3. The Tribal Council upheld the Land Committee's action in June 1971. Plain-
tiff was awarded an exclusive possessory interest in 4.48 acres and "a joint undivided
interest in certain mountainside land." Id.
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"denied her the equal protection of its laws and deprived her of her
property without due process of law' 4 in violation of the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).5 The federal district court found that the
tribal action violated the due process provision of the ICRA, set aside
the tribal action, and restored to plaintiff her original possessory interest
in the eleven acres.6 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed in part, remanded, and held: While the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 entitles an Indian to due process incident to a redivision of a
possessory interest in tribal lands, it does not empower a federal court to
substitute its determination for that of the tribe on the substantive issue
of the case.7
4. Id.
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970). Section 1302 provides in part:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of
law ....
Section 1302 is part of Title H1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Known as the Indian
Civil Rights Act (ICRA) or the Indian Bill of Rights, Titles H through VII were a
consolidation of legislation that had been under consideration by the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee since 1961. Attached by the
Senate as a rider to H.R. Res. 2516, the bill passed the House with little discussion. See
114 CoNG. REc. 9550-621 (1968). The legislative history of the bill from the early Sen-
ate hearings through its passage by the House is traced in Note, The Indian Bill of
Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L. Rrv. 1343,
1355-56 n.53 (1969).
The legislative history indicates clearly that Congress intended to protect tribal
members' liberties. The character and extent of those liberties, however, are not so
clearly indicated. According to Senator Ervin, Title I was intended to "grant to the
American Indians enumerated constitutional rights and protection from arbitrary action
in their relationship with tribal governments, State governments, and the Federal govern-
ment." 114 CoNG. REc. 394 (1968). Representative Meeds, on the other hand, stated
that "[tihe provisions of the Indian Bill of Rights are not identical to the Federal Con-
stitutional Bill of Rights, and the differences are largely in order to accommodate tribal
customs." 114 CoNG. REc. 9596 (1968).
For detailed considerations of the ICRA, see Coulter, Federal Law and Indian
Tribal Law: The Right to Civil Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 CoLUM.
SURVEY Hum" RIGHTS L. REv. 49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Coulter]; Reiblich, In.
dian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 AaIz. L. REv. 617 (1968); Note,
supra.
6. The district court's unpublished opinion is discussed in Crowe v. Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians, ,Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1237 (4th
Cir. 1974).
When a tribe adheres to procedures or customs analogous to those found in Anglo-
American culture, a judgment on the merits may follow. For example, the one-man,
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The sovereignty of Indian tribes first gained judicial recognition in
the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia.8 Indian tribes
have been described as "distinct, independent political communities,"'
"subordinate and dependent nations,"'10 and "quasi-sovereign entities."' ,-
Although the original sovereignty of Indian tribes has been repeatedly
acknowledged,' 2 it has been limited by the plenary powers of the federal
one-vote principle established in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), has been held ap-
plicable to tribes. Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 1973); White
Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973).
8. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Historically, Indian tribes were treated as sov-
ereign nations. They executed treaties, maintained territorial boundaries, and practiced
self-government. The Constitution implicitly recognized the status of tribes as "distinct,
independent political communities" by sanctioning treaties previously made with the In-
dian tribes and by declaring treaties past and future to be the supreme law of the land.
Id. at 558-61.
It has been suggested that Chief Justice Marshall's approach to tribal sovereignty in
Worcester was mandated by the equality of power which existed between the tribes and
the federal government during the colonial and early postrevolutionary expansionist pe-
riods. Coulter 51-54. By 1871, however, the power of the federal government had in-
creased to such an extent that Congress terminated treaty-making entirely, and began
to distinguish between the tribes' internal and external sovereignty. In their external
affairs, tribes were subordinated to the federal government; internally, tribal govern-
ments continued to exercise plenary power over tribal members and their activities on
reservations. Id. This complete power of internal self-government enjoyed by the tribes
rendered the Bill of Rights inapplicable to any dispute between a tribal government and
its members. See note 14 infra. This "modern" view of the scope of tribal sovereignty,
maintained until the passage of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, was expressed
in Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 92 (8th Cir. 1956). See note 11
Infra.
9. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
10. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir.
1959).
11. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956). The court
stated:
mhe Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, acknowledges the
paramount authority of the United States with regard to Indian tribes but
recognizes the existence of Indian tribes as quasi sovereign entities possessing
all the inherent rights of sovereignty excepting where restrictions have been
placed thereon by the United States itself.
Id. at 92 (emphasis original).
12. See, e.g., Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (powers of local self-gov-
ernment enjoyed by Cherokee Nation existed prior to Constitution); Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 572 (1883), citing United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876)
(tribes are "semi-independent," "exempt from our laws," and dealt with in "their na-
tional or tribal character"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)
(Indian nations always considered "distinct, independent political communities, retaining
their original natural rights"). See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375
(1886); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Ex parte Tiger, 2
Indian Terr. 41, 47 S.W. 304 (1898); COHEN 122-26.
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government."s While the external or "international" powers of tribes
were severely curtailed, matters involving internal affairs of the tribes
remained almost exclusively within the province of the tribal govern-
ment.14  The ICRA,' 5 however, cast doubt on the tribe's power to
13. The United States government derives its power over the Indian tribes from
three sources. Comment, The Indian Battle for Self-Determination, 58 CALIF. L. Riy.
445, 447-52 (1970). The original source is the United States Constitution. Under
U.S. CONsT. art. H, § 2, cl. 2, the President has "Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ... ." Although once a significant factor in
the government's relationship with the independent Indian tribes, see note 8 supra, treaty
making ended in 1871. Comment, supra at 447-48. See also Coulter 52-60. In addi-
tion, U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 grants Congress power "[to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ... ." This
power, exercised by Congress as early as 1790, remains in force. Comment, supra at
447-48. See also CoHEN 89.
The second source of power was based upon the now abandoned "guardian-ward" the-
ory. Dicta in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), discussed the
federal government's duty to protect "[a] people once numerous, powerful, and truly in-
dependent . .. gradually sinking beneath our superior policy, our arts and our arms
... ." Id. at 15. Chief Justice Marshall continued, "[The Indians] are in a state of
pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
Id. at 17. For examples of judicial application of the theory, see United States v. Nice,
241 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1916); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
See Comment, supra at 449-50.
The third source of plenary power, federal ownership of Indian land, was first ex-
pounded in Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 240 (1823).
Federal title in Indian lands was derived from the "original fundamental principle, that
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it." Id. at 574. Title in the grantees
was subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. By treaty Great Britain passed title
to the United States. Id. at 584. As "landlord," the federal government has power to
control occupants of the land. Comment, supra at 450. See United States v. Kagama,
supra at 380 (reaffirming principles of Johnson & Graham's Lessee).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916) (personal and domestic
relations, offenses against person or property); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556
(1883) (murder of one Sioux by another on reservation); Motah v. United States, 402
F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968) (contested tribal election). See CoHEN 122:
Indian self-government, the decided cases hold, includes the power of an
Indian tribe to adopt and operate under a form of government of the Indians'
choosing, to define conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic rela-
tions of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate
property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to control the conduct of members
of municipal legislation, and to administer justice.
See also Prairie Band of the Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Puckkee, 321 F.2d 767
(10th Cir. 1963); Note, The Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indian, 51
VA. L. REv. 121, 123, n.12 (1965).
Beginning with the Supreme Court's decision in Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896), federal courts have held the Bill of Rights inapplicable to Indians living on res-
ervations. "[Ais the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation
existed prior to the Constitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment
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resolve intratribal disputes solely through tribal mechanisms."
Enacted by Congress as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the
ICRA'1 was intended to protect individual Indians from tribal actions
that would deprive them of fundamental rights.' The ICRA drew
heavily from the Bill of Rights and incorporated significant parts of the
fourteenth amendment as well.' 9 Although Congress did not intend to
weaken tribal authority, 20 the ICRA conferred jurisdiction on the feder-
... " Id. at 384. This decision, which was consistent with the government's prior
policy of noninterference with intratribal disputes, remained tenable for many years.
See Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959) (first
amendment inapplicable to Indian nations); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553
(8th Cir. 1958) (fifth and fourteenth amendments inapplicable to action of Indian tribe
taxing use of Indian trust land); CoHEN 181. But see Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d
369 (9th Cir. 1965), in which the court significantly deviated from this policy. In find-
ing federal jurisdiction, the court distinguished Talton and asserted that the tribal court,
because it had been created and maintained by the federal executive, was but an exten-
sion of a federal agency. See Lazarus, Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act: An Indian
Bill of Rights, 45 N. DA& L. Rnv. 337, 340-44 (1969); Comment, supra note 13; Note,
supra note 5.
15. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1970). See note 5 supra.
16. Prior to the ICRA, federal courts generally would not decide intratribal suits,
ire note 14 supra. With the ICRA's passage, jurisdiction became available under 28
U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970) in conjunction with 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1970), see note
22 infra. The congressional policy underlying the ICRA, however, was not to weaken
tribal sovereignty, but rather to make tribal government more responsive to individual
tribal members' needs. See, e.g., Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619 (D.N.D. 1973).
17. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II-VII, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at
25 U.S.C.A. § 1301-41 (1970)).
18. See note 5 supra. See generally Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619, 621
(D.N.D. 1973); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715, 718 (D. Neb. 1971); Note,
supra note 5, at 1360.
19. The sections of the Bill of Rights that were omitted from the ICRA were dis-
cussed in Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 682 (10th Cir. 1971); Note, supra note
5, at 1353. For example, the establishment of religion by Indian tribes is not prohibited
by the ICRA. For a complete sectional analysis of the ICRA, see Reiblich, supra note
5.
20. See Lazarus, supra note 14, at 346; note 16 supra.
The policy of Indian self-determination was specifically adopted by Congress in a res-
olution on December 11, 1971:
[I]t is the sense of Congress that-(1) our national Indian policy shall give
full recognition to and be predicated upon the unique relationship that exists
between this group of citizens and the Federal Government and that a govern-
mentwide commitment shall derive from this relationship that will be designed
to give Indians the freedom and encouragement to develop their individual,
family, and community potential and to determine their own future to the
maximum extent possible; . . .
(3) improving the quality and quantity of social and economic development
efforts for Indian people and maximizing opportunities for Indian control and
self-determination shall be a major goal of our National Indian policy;
Washington University Open Scholarship
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al courts to hear matters formerly adjudicated solely by the tribes. 21
After finding jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(4)22 the Fourth Circuit in Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians, Inc. reaffirmed the doctrine of internal Indian sovereignty.'-
The court found the doctrine relevant since "it plays an integral role in
the concept of tribal property law' 2 4 by empowering the tribe "to
regulate the use and disposition of individual property among its mem-
bers."25 Under the Indian concept of property, ownership rests in the
Lohnes v. Cloud, 366 F. Supp. 619, 622 (D.N.D. 1973) (deletions and punctuation of
the court), quoting 117 CONG. REc. 46383 (1971).
21. See note 16 supra; note 22 infra.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action author-
ized by law to be commenced by any person:
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any
Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right
to vote.
Use of section 1302 of the ICRA, quoted in part note 5 supra, in conjunction with 28
U.S.C. § 1343(4), developed soon after the passage of the Act. In Dodge v. Nakai,
298 F. Supp. 17, 25 (D. Ariz. 1968), the court used the reasoning of Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413, n.1 (1968), to fashion a means for establishing fed-
eral jurisdiction in cases arising under the ICRA. Under Iones, a plaintiff must find
a federal statute protecting his rights to come within the reach of § 1343(4). See Dry
Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 933 (10th Cir. 1975); Daly
v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d
1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1973). See also Johnson v. Lower Elwha Tribal Community, 484
F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1973); Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F.2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972);
Note, supra note 5, at 1372-73; Note, Equitable and Declaratory Relief Under the Indlan
Civil Rights Act, 48 N. DAm. L. REv. 695 (1972).
23. 506 F.2d 1231, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Wright, 53
F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1931).
24. 506 F.2d at 1235.
25. Id., quoting CoI-mN 143. The power to control tribal lands lies with Congress.
Absent congressional legislation, federal courts have no power to regulate tribal lands.
See, e.g., Washburn v. Parker, 7 F. Supp. 120 (W.D.N.Y. 1934); United States v. Seneca
Nation of New York Indians, 274 F. 946, 951 (W.D.N.Y. 1921). Instead, federal
courts have a duty on behalf of the federal government to preserve intact the Indian
reservation, leaving the management of internal affairs within the hands of the Indians.
United States v. Charles, 23 F. Supp. 346, 348 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
When the United States gives tribal lands to other persons or entities or appropriates
them for its own use, the tribes must be justly compensated. See, e.g., United States
v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 110 (1934). Although the Indians have only a right
of occupancy, it is "as sacred as that of the United States to the fee." United States
v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873). See also United States v. Jim, 409 U.S.
80, 89 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S.
339, 345 (1941).
The power to regulate the inheritance of tribal land was established in Jones Y. Mee-
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tribe,!- so that the interest of an individual member is limited to a "right
of use [which] depends upon tribal law or custom."27 The court found
that in two separate resolutions the Eastern Band of Cherokees had
employed its internal sovereign power over property to set up proce-
dures intended to avoid tribal land disputes. 28
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding setting aside
the Tribal Council action. 29  The tribe's cancellation of plaintiff's pos-
sessory interest without notice or hearing was clearly violative of the
plaintiff's due process rights under the ICRA. 0
On the substantive issue, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court's restoration of plaintiff's possessory interest in the land.
The court found that the district court had erroneously applied "Anglo-
American principles of real property law" that were incompatible with
the Indian concept of communal ownership of tribal property.3 1 The
court stated that ICRA was designed "to protect individual members
from arbitrary tribal action," 2 but not to abolish "the historic sovereign-
han, 175 U.S. 1 (1899). The Supreme Court held that inheritance is "controlled by
the laws, usages, and customs of the tribe." Id. at 29.
26. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1235 (4th Cir.
1974). The court stated:
Under the Indian concept of tribal property the ownership and use of the
land is communal. The power of absolute ownership is lodged in the tribe and
the interests of the individual members of the tribe are "limited to mere occu-
pancy of the tracts set apart for homes with the right to free use in common
of the unoccupied portion of the reserve. .. "
Id., quoting Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196, 215 (1894). See also
United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80, 82 (1972); Sizemore v. Brady, 235 U.S. 441, 446
(1914); note I supra. Cherokee reservation land is communally owned. See Cherokee
Nation v. Journeycake, supra.
27. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1235 (4th
Cir. 1974). See also, Prairie Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. United States, 165 F.
Supp. 139 (Ct. Cl. 1958); CoHEmN 144; note 1 supra.
28. 506 F.2d at 1235. The Fourth Circuit further recognized that the laws and cus-
toms of the Eastern Band of Cherokees had become formalized with the Tribe's incorpo-
ration in 1889. Through amendments to the Corporate Charter and two resolutions-
the first was passed in February 1931 and the second was ratified in October 1960
-the tribe had retained all powers over the disposition of its land. Id. at 1235-36.
An amendment in 1897, for example, conferred upon the tribe the power to manage
and control all tribal property whether real or personal. This procedure was refined in
the Resolution of 1931 establishing a Business Committee of the Tribal Council to settle
all matters concerning tribal land. Id.
29. Id. at 1237.
30. 506 F.2d at 1234.
31. Id. at 1236. The concept of the vesting of rights, for example, is foreign to
Indian tradition. Id. at 1235. See also note 26 supra.
32. 506 F.2d at 1237.
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ty of a tribe."33 Therefore, the court held that the substantive contro-
versy should be decided "in the light of the traditions and customs of the
Indian people."34  The court remanded the case to the district court
with instructions that the tribe "reconsider" the division of the posses-
sory interests in the property.3 5
The Crowe opinion is praiseworthy for clearly recognizing the scope
of intervention authorized by the ICRA 0 and refusing to apply com-
mon law property principles to Indian land disputes.8 7  By recog-
nizing this limited scope, the court maintained the delicate balance
implicit within the ICRA between the sovereignty of the tribe and the
rights of its individual members. While the ICRA further impinges
upon Indian tribal sovereignty, Crowe reflects the notion that the inter-
vention authorized by the ICRA is not unbridled.3 8
Although the decision in Crowe is not a landmark, it is illustrative of
the problems that the ICRA presents. Despite the court's hesitation to
intervene in internal tribal affairs, the decision raises the possibility that
application of the ICRA will increasingly limit internal tribal sovereign-
ty. Only if courts continue to distinguish carefully between the proce-
dural and substantive areas of a dispute, thus avoiding "the application
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1236.
35. Id. at 1237. The reconsideration was to occur in a proceeding that "accorded
to the plaintiff ... the rights of procedural due process." Id. (footnote omitted).
36. See notes 29-34 supra and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. The Crowe decision is but one in a series of cases construing the "due process"
and "equal protection" provisions of the ICRA. For other decisions contributing to this
interpretative process, see Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe, 507
F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975) (equal protection clause of ICRA not coextensive with equal
protection clause of Constitution); Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973)
(blood quantum requirement for tribal elections, if applied uniformly, not violative of
statutory equal protection); Williams v. Siseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe Council, 387 F.
Supp. 1144 (S.D.N.D. 1975) (tribal election procedures satisfied statutory due process);
Janis v. Wilson, 385 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974) (notice and hearing satisfied statutory
equal protection and due process); Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438
(D.S.D. 1974) (if uniformly applied, membership provisions satisfied statutory equal
protection); Solomon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971) (right of tribal coun-
cil to exclude electees from council amounted to a denial of due process under ICRA);
Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971) (§ 1302(8) protects right to
be free from excessive injurious force that is arbitrarily inflicted); Dodge v. Nakai, 298
IF. Supp. 26 (D. Ariz. 1969) (exclusion of nonmember from reservation for raucous be-
havior was a denial of due process and an abridgement of free speech).
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of technical rules of common law' 39 to internal Indian disputes, will
tribes remain free to develop according to their own traditions.4"
39. Crowe v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, Inc., 506 F.2d 1231, 1236 (4th Cir.
1974).
40. Congress did not intend the ICRA to be a carbon copy of the Bill of Rights.
See note 5 supra. Certain sections that were incompatible with tribal traditions were
intentionally omitted. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. Thus, although the
ICRA incorporates some of the language of the Constitution, "this does not necessarily
mean that the terms 'due process' and 'equal protection' as used in the ICRA carry their
full Constitutional impact." McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653, 655 (10th Cir. 1974).
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